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I. MARTINEZ IN CONTEXT: KEEPING THE DREAM ALIVE FOR ALL
AMERICANS
I believe our post-Civil War amended federal Constitution is best read
to ensure that democratically-enacted laws and ordinances work as they
should-that while the laws and ordinances should reflect the noblest aspi-
rations and values of our community writ large, they should also ensure that
the least among us are not unduly disfavored simply because they lack a
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seat at the table. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment commands that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws";' the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment declares that no person shall be deprived "of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."' 2 Following the Civil War,
these two bulwarks of the Fourteenth Amendment, along with the eradica-
tion of badges of slavery in the Thirteenth and the provision of voting rights
in the Fifteenth, were intended to safeguard the rights of the newly-freed
African slaves. In modem constitutional law, the Supreme Court has so-
lemnly invoked these twin provisions-equal protection and due process-
to ensure that "discrete and insular minorities"3 are protected from the
whims of an overreaching majority.
Nowhere is the Court's concern for dismantling unearned privilege
and invidious stereotype more on display than in the canonical case of
Brown v. Board of Education.4 In Brown, the Court declared null and void
Plessy v. Ferguson's5 doctrine of "separate but equal," ruling that public
schools could not be operated on a racially-segregated basis. State-
sanctioned divisions based on an accident of birth stamped upon poor black
children a badge of inferiority, even if the facilities at white and black
schools were presumed to be roughly equivalent. While ensuing desegrega-
tion efforts were met with massive resistance by local schools and states,6
Brown is best read as the Court's landmark effort at what may be termed
"integrative egalitarianism" to ensure that lingering inequities-bequeathed
minority children by slavery and begat by Jim Crow-were thoroughly
dismantled so that blacks could become fully integrated into societal citi-
zenship.7 "Integrative egalitarianism" rests on the idea that governmental
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, §1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (Due Process
Clause). The Fifth Amendment also contains a Due Process Clause that has been interpreted
as providing equal protection to individuals discriminated against by the federal government.
See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (declaring Washington, D.C. schools unconstitu-
tionally segregated by race).
3. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6. "Southern support for segregation remained so strong that the first public ele-
mentary and secondary schools in Mississippi were not integrated until 1964, and even then
all integration statewide involved a total of only sixty African-American students attending
White schools in four different districts. Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tink-
er's Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1129, 1132-33 (2009).
7. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26
CARDOZO L. REv. 1689 (2005) (describing the development of the Court's unfinished equali-
ty project from Plessy to Brown to Grutter); Michael A. Olivas, Brown and the Desegrega-
tive Ideal: Location, Race, and College Attendance Policies, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 391
(2005).
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programs that are designed to overcome arbitrary inequalities stemming
from accidents of birth are a worthwhile investment in society's future.
Understood from this modem perspective, education laws that seek to
help smart, hard-working students attain their full potential without regard
to their circumstances of birth can rightfully claim to be heirs to Brown.!
Like the Court's desegregation command, progressive, affirmative laws that
remove roadblocks created by poverty, race, and immigration status help
students reach their full potential while simultaneously investing in improv-
ing society as well. Put another way, these laws embrace the principle that
all individuals deserve a shot at the American dream.
Let me introduce you to one pseudonymous student whom the law has
helped and who has in turn helped her community.' By dint of hard work,
the encouragement of mentors, and the beneficence of favorable laws, "Ni-
cole" was able to acquire lawful immigration status, complete her college
degree, and earn her doctorate in education. Like many families seeking
greener pastures, Nicole's family brought her to the United States from
Mexico when she was only four years old. Like many immigrant children,
she struggled to learn English and then to convince her teachers that her
rudimentary language skills betrayed her sharp mind, all the while trying to
balance her schoolwork with her many chores at home. Her perseverance
paid off. By the time she reached high school, Nicole knew she had the
ability and work ethic to set her sights on applying to a university. Unfortu-
nately, she was rudely awakened in her junior year when she discovered that
she did not possess the proper documents allowing her to reside in the Unit-
ed States, thereby disqualifying her from receiving much-needed financial
support:
I remember talking to my parents about it and my mom expressing some concern
about it. I was telling her I wanted to go to a four-year college and I kept talking
about it because I was excited about the idea or the opportunity of just applying.
Then I remember her telling me that it wasn't possible for me to go to college be-
cause I didn't have papers. I think it was confusing for me because it was a topic
that we never really discussed.' 0
Fortunately, Nicole's story has a happy ending. After a few years at a
community college, Nicole's family adjusted to lawful status under then-
applicable amnesty laws, and she became eligible for financial aid at the
two University of California schools that had accepted her." Following her
8. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassifica-
tion Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1470 (2004) (ex-
amining the contested notions of equality that emerge out of Brown, one focusing on antisu-
bordination and the other on anticlassification); Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and
Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1988).
9. See WILLIAM PEREZ, WE ARE AMERICANS 141-45 (2009) for Nicole's full story.
10. WILLIAM PEREZ, WE ARE AMERICANS 143 (2009) (quoting Nicole).
11. Id. at 144-45.
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successful college stint, she entered a doctoral program in education and
now seeks to give back to those less fortunate:
For me, meaningful work in the field of education means working with districts or
with programs that are targeting low-performing schools and low-performing stu-
dents. Working with the students who are the most underserved, and the teachers,
principals, and districts that serve the students that are most underserved. That
kind of work is very meaningful to me. I want to have a presence in conversations
when the leaders in my field are having discussions about the plight of English
learners and having the opportunity to have a voice in that room.'
2
Now that she has completed her formal education, what does this new-
ly-minted Ph.D. in Education have to say about the desirability of investing
in students who could be deported at any time and who have no right to be
in the U.S.?
I would say that if a student's test scores, drive, motivation, good grades, responsi-
bility, and potential is based on their success in high school or before, then I would
say, foster that learning and success so that we have more productive individuals in
this society. By limiting the education of an individual who is undocumented, you
are limiting the potential of young people who could be great leaders.'
3
Nicole's story and struggle reveal the promise effective laws have in
helping individuals reach their full potential. For talented students who
happen to be undocumented, cursed solely because they dutifully accompa-
nied their parents across the border and are often unaware of their "illegali-
ty," laws that help them adjust to a resident immigration status serve as a
practical solution both for them and the nation. While the United States
benefits from a well-educated workforce, little benefit seems likely to ensue
by deporting an intelligent, hardworking person who happens to be remova-
ble. 4 Indeed, domestic data reveal that more immigrants are in highly
skilled than unskilled jobs, 5 and if immigration, especially over time, has
12. Id. at 145 (quoting Nicole).
13. Id. at 141 (quoting Nicole).
14. Adopting a formalist view, one might contend that removing someone who is
deportable is generally preferable to doing nothing. Although even at that general level of
abstraction, the law itself recognizes certain higher-order goals that serve as mitigating cir-
cumstances, for instance, the possibility of extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen relative follow-
ing deportation of the noncitizen. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (2006) (describing
hardship waiver); 8 C.F.R. § 1212.7 (2010) (describing hardship waiver and 1-601 applica-
tion process, respectively). Furthermore, even accepting the contested notion that deporting
all undocumented students would have a positive net economic benefit to the U.S., one won-
ders whether a better immigration policy would be to find a pathway to citizenship for the
best and brightest of these, a policy that seems to undergird California's thinking in AB540
and motivate supporters of the federal DREAM Act.
15. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Immigrants in Work Force: Study Belies Image, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, at A 1, available at http://www.nytimes.comI2010/04/16/us/
16skilled.html.
Vol. 2011:275
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been a net benefit to the country, 6 then encouraging more immigrants to
become highly skilled through higher education seems a sound investment.
This is a model of integration as well as one of equality, one consistent with
the theme of "integrative egalitarianism" that emanates from Brown.7
Yet, perhaps because of its prominent role in the United States' racial
history," educating the undocumented student has been a wedge issue for
those studying educational equity and access, especially over the last ten
years or so. 9 Opponents cite upholding the "rule of law" as an inviolable
16. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Guest Workers and Justice in a Second-Best World,
34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 3, 12-13 (2008) ("The National Research Council finds that on aver-
age, the fiscal impact of the descendants of an immigrant 'is always positive, regardless of
the immigrant's age at arrival and education level."') (quoting NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 329
(James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997)).
17. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493-94 (1954).
18. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative
Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law,
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000) (arguing that discriminatory immigration laws mirrored the
discriminatory domestic laws of their time, leading to the disadvantaging of individuals on
the basis of race); see also Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow
and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163 (2010) (arguing that
anti-immigration laws discriminate against Latinas/os the same way that Jim Crow laws
discriminated against African-Americans).
19. Many commentators have written about the educational challenges faced by
immigrant and Latina/o students. See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The DREAM Act,
and Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435 (2004); Michael A. Oli-
vas, Undocumented College Students, Taxation, and Financial Aid: A Technical Note, 32
REV. HIGHER EDUC. 407 (2009); Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Resi-
dency and the Response to Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99 (2008); Victor C. Romero,
Postsecondary School Education Benefits for Undocumented Immigrants: Promises and
Pitfalls, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393 (2002); Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, Not
"Sleeping, " Giant: The Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on Latinalo and Immi-
grant Communities, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1281-82 (2008) (discussing the federal DREAM
Act). Noteworthy book-length treatments include: PATRICIA GANDARA & FRANCES
CONTRERAS, THE LATINO EDUCATION CRISIS (2009); MARIA PABON LOPEZ & GERARDO R.
L6PEZ, PERSISTENT INEQUALITY: CONTEMPORARY REALITIES IN THE EDUCATION OF
UNDOCUMENTED LATINA/O STUDENTS (2010); PEREZ, supra note 10; ROSEMARY C.
SALOMONE, TRUE AMERICAN: LANGUAGE, IDENTITY, AND THE EDUCATION OF IMMIGRANT
CHILDREN (2010). Indeed, the centrist news magazine, The Economist, recently published a
blog op-ed in support of the DREAM Act, noting that
[t]he DREAM Act sends the message that although American immigration law in
effect tries to make water run uphill, we are not monsters. It says that we will not
hobble the prospects of young people raised and schooled in America just because
we were so perverse to demand that their parents wait in a line before a door that
never opens. It signals that we were once a nation of immigrants, and even if we
have become too fearful and small to properly honour that noble legacy, America
in some small way remains a land of opportunity.
W.W., The Message the DREAM Act Sends, THE ECONOMIST, (Nov. 21, 2010, 3:39 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/1l/amnesty and decency.
HeinOnline  -- 2011 Mich. St. L. Rev. 279 2011
Michigan State Law Review
first principle, noting the irony of providing governmental assistance to stu-
dents who have no right to live in this country in the first place.
Most recently, out-of-state students attending California's many public
colleges and universities have sued the state over Assembly Bill 540
(AB540),2° which provides in-state tuition to all who have attended a Cali-
fornia high school for three years and have obtained a high school diploma,
without regard to where they currently reside. For example, a U.S. citizen
from Oregon who attends and graduates from boarding school in California
will qualify for in-state tuition at a California public college.2'
What troubles the out-of-state plaintiffs in Martinez v. Regents of the
University of California, however, is their belief that federal law preempts
California's in-state tuition policy because the state doesn't simultaneously
allow all nonresident U.S. citizens to qualify for lower tuition, just those-
like the hypothetical Oregon boarding student-who have attended and
graduated from a California high school.22
My interest in Martinez stems not from the fine points of preemption,
plain meaning, or "privileges and immunities" analysis raised by the parties.
As with many constitutional issues, strong arguments can be raised by both
sides, and indeed, they have. Rather, I hope to show that AB540 and its
federal sister,23 the proposed Development, Relief, and Education for Alien
20. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2011) (AB540 refers to Assembly Bill 540,
which was codified as § 68130.5).
21. See [Proposed] Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Respondents at 12-13, Marti-
nez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010) (No. CV052064), available at
http://latinojustice.org/civil rights/cases/Martinez/o2v.%20Regents%20Amicus%20Brief.p
df [hereinafter Martinez Brief]. For additional examples of out-of-state residents who would
benefit from AB540, see Josh Keller, US. Citizens Reap Unintended Benefiffrom Califor-
nia's Immigrant-Tuition Law, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 11, 2009, at A18 ("In a little-
known quirk of the state law, thousands of students who receive in-state tuition under the
provision are not, in fact, undocumented immigrants. They are legal U.S. residents, who are
able to take advantage of the law's broad language to avoid paying higher, out-of-state tui-
tion.").
22. See generally Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 862 (Cal.
2010) (finding AB540 not preempted by federal law). An appeal is expected, although it is
uncertain whether the U.S. Supreme Court will be interested in weighing in on this contro-
versy anytime soon. See Ian Lovett, Court Backs Illegal Immigrant Students, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2010, at A20. For more analysis of Martinez, see KRISTEN MILLER & CELINA
MORENO, MARTINEZ V. REGENTS: MIS-STEP OR WAVE OF THE FUTURE (2008), available at
http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/monograph/08-07.pdf, Ralph W. Kasarda, Affirmative Action
Gone Haywire: Why State Laws Granting College Tuition Preferences to Illegal Aliens Are
Preempted by Federal Law, 2009 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 197.
23. As of this writing, California is but one of eleven states that provide in-state
tuition for graduates of state high schools, including undocumented students. See Undocu-
mented Student Tuition: Overview, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12876. The federal DREAM Act has been in play
for some ten years now, prompting Senators Durbin and Lugar to ask DHS Secretary Napoli-
tano to grant deferred action to undocumented students who would qualify if the DREAM
Vol. 2011:275280
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Minors ("DREAM") Act,24 should properly be read in light of the equal
protection guarantees of our amended federal Constitution-that is, both
policies promote Brown's ideal of "integrative egalitarianism" by making
higher education accessible to all successful students, regardless of their
immigration status. When viewed in this light, Nicole's prescription for
what to do with talented undocumented students is clearly correct: the coun-
try should invest in undocumented students as it does others by making sure
that higher education is accessible and affordable so that these students, and
their adopted homeland, mutually benefit from their academic potential and
future success.
In making this case, I examine two sets of the Supreme Court's equal
protection and due process jurisprudence. The first is Brown and its recent
progeny, which has veered slowly off course over the past thirty years,
substituting colorblind constitutionalism for integrative egalitarianism, and
in the process, threatening to dislodge Plyler v. Doe25 as the high-water
mark of the immigrant rights movement.26 The second, and in my view,
more supportive, precedent comes from the gay rights movement, in which
this conservative Court has been a strong ally against majoritarian forces
that have threatened to keep sexual minorities from enjoying basic freedoms
others take for granted. It is in the progression from Bowers v. Hardwick27
to Romer v. Evans28 and Lawrence v. Texas29 that I find clues to why an oth-
erwise conservative Court might be willing to utilize constitutional doc-
trines or statutory interpretation techniques to uphold democratically-
enacted initiatives intended to alleviate subordination, embrace integration,
and promote equality, consistent with the promises of our amended Consti-
tution." Such a reading of the equality guarantees helps firmly establish
that Plyler is a legitimate and proper heir to Brown's ideal of integrative
egalitarianism, rather than as a precedent under siege from those apparently
obsessed with policing the bright line between "legals" and "illegals," for
no better reason than that the law allows it.
Act passed. See Durbin, Lugar Ask Secretary Napolitano to Stop Deportations of DREAM
Act Students, U.S. SENATOR DICK DURBIN (Apr. 21, 2010), http://durbin.senate.gov/show
Release.cfm?releaseld=324015. In December 2010, the House passed the latest version of
the federal DREAM Act, but the bill died in the Senate. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Immigration
Vote Leaves Policy in Disarray, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at A35.
24. H.R. 6497, 111 th Cong. (2010).
25. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
26. See infra Part II.
27. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
28. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
29. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
30. See infra Part Il1.
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II. FROM BROWN TO PARENTS INVOLVED: REJECTING ANTISUBORDINATION,
EMBRACING COLORBLIND CONSTITUTIONALISM
While correctly hailed as a monumental moral victory recognizing the
inherent equality of the races, Brown31 was not without its critics. Derrick
Bell, for instance, opined that Brown would, over time, be limited in its
reach, that a white majority would not easily cede power to minorities of
color unless it was ultimately in the majority's interest.32 This "interest
convergence" theory has certainly proven prescient when viewed in light of
the Court's desegregation and affirmative action decisions, especially from
the 1970s on.33 A review of the Court's opinions reveals a slow unraveling
of its commitment to overseeing societal integration for the benefit of the
minority.34 Beginning with its opinion on desegregation remedies in Brown
II, the Court steadily withdrew from its role as protector of equal rights,
adopting instead a colorblind faith in legislative majorities and downplaying
the gap between the haves and have-nots.35
A. Desegregation and Massive Resistance
Realizing the need for a strong statement outlining how Brown I was
to be enforced, the Court began on a road to compromise with its unfortu-
nately equivocal command to the states in Brown 11.6 Recognizing the
practical limitations of detailing implementation procedures for each of the
myriad Southern school districts charged with effectuating desegregation,
the Court placed primary oversight of the process in the local federal district
courts: "[T]he cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such pro-
ceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980); see also Owen M. Fiss, Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976) (arguing that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to protect disadvantaged groups like African-Americans). More
recently, Risa Goluboff questioned whether the decision to abandon workers' rights theories
in favor of a direct assault on Plessy v. Ferguson led to an abandonment of material equality
as a touchstone of the Civil Rights movement. RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF
CIVIL RIGHTS 15 (2007).
33. See generally Bell, supra note 32.
34. This analysis borrows greatly from Erwin Chemerinsky's cogent summary of
this important period. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 721-32 (3d ed. 2006).
35. Of course, this retrenchment was not relegated to the area of education, but
involved other equal protection claims brought by minorities in criminal law, for example,
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), employment, for example, Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), and housing, for example, Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
36. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Vol. 2011:275
HeinOnline  -- 2011 Mich. St. L. Rev. 282 2011
Immigrant Education
are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscri-
minatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases."37 This
was an unfortunate choice of words: while "speed" suggested urgency, "de-
liberate" implicitly condoned "delay"-and, not surprisingly, the Southern
states resisted mightily. Consequently, from the late 1950s through the late
1960s, the Court found itself taking a number of appeals, striking down a
voluntary transfer plan that would privilege student choices to re-
segregate,38 a scheme to close a local public school system rather than dese-
gregate,39 and a "freedom-of-choice" plan that allowed students to choose to
remain in segregated schools.40
In a case that perhaps marked the pinnacle of its desegregation power,
the Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education approved
a sweeping remedial plan established by the district court over the objec-
tions of the local school board.4' Focusing on the issue of how majority and
minority students were to be assigned to Charlotte, North Carolina's
schools, the Court vested broad authority in the local federal court to con-
sider racial balance and quotas, the elimination of single-race schools, the
demarcation of school boundaries and attendance zones, and the remedial
efficacy of busing, although noting that "[j]udicial authority enters only
when local authority defaults." '42
It was this recognition of limited judicial authority amid a sweeping
affirmation of court oversight in Swann that presaged its inevitable retreat.
From the 1970s through the early 1990s, the Court progressively withdrew
judicial resources in the battle over desegregation, preferring instead to al-
low local authorities autonomy to decide when and to what extent integra-
tion was sufficiently, achieved.
Thus, in Milliken v. Bradley, a short three years after Swann, a scant
majority of the Court struck down Detroit's desegregation plan encompass-
ing both the inner metropolitan area and its adjacent suburban school dis-
tricts.43 Writing once again for the Court, then Chief Justice Burger opined
that any official segregation in Detroit was limited to the city proper, and
therefore, the suburban schools should not have been burdened with a re-
37. Id. at 301 (emphasis added). See also JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL
WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 337 (2006) ("'[A]ll deliberate speed' came to mean
much more deliberation than speed."). See generally CHARLES J. OGLETREE JR., ALL
DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION (2004).
38. See Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
39. See Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
40. See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
41. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
42. Id. at 16.
43. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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medy." The four dissenters were quick to respond that segregation in De-
troit was affected by a prior statewide policy of segregated schools thereby
undercutting the efficacy of a plan limited solely to the city.45 Put different-
ly, if inner-city Detroit was predominantly black and the suburbs were pre-
dominantly white, and yet, a legal desegregation order would involve inner-
city schools only, then "the more difficult it would be to avoid having a
substantial number of all-black or nearly all-black schools," '46 a factor which
Burger himself thought appropriate to consider in Swann. 47
By the mid- 1 970s, the Court had all but lost its appetite for judicial in-
tervention in the school desegregation project.4" In Pasadena City Board of
Education v. Spangler, the Court refused to affirm a lower court's order that
a previously-segregated school system redraw its attendance lines yearly in
order to combat the increasing re-segregation of schools from 1970 to
1974.49 Because nondiscriminatory student assignment was achieved in
1970 and residential shifts during subsequent years would be inevitable, the
Court held that judicial intervention was no longer appropriate."
In a trio of cases from the 1990s, the Court completed its withdrawal,
holding judicial oversight of a local desegregation plan unconstitutional
when: (1) "local authorities have operated in compliance with it for a rea-
sonable period of time" notwithstanding the persistence of segregative ef-
fects;5' (2) the school district has fully complied with the particular order at
issue, even if it hasn't complied with others;52 and (3) the lower court had
exceeded its authority by requiring a unitary school system to seek majority
students from outside the district, improve teacher's salaries, and correct
test score disparities between majority and minority students. 3 It seemed
the Court had little patience for remedying the defacto effects of desegrega-
tion as long as formal dejure segregation had been dismantled. That many
inner-city public schools today are predominantly minority while many
44. Id. at 750.
45. See id. at 757-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id at 762-81 (White, J., dissenting);
id. at 781-815 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 764 (White, J., dissenting).
47. Swann, 402 U.S. at 25-26.
48. That is not to say that the 1970s were bereft of desegregation lawsuits; for some
groups, the 1970s marked a litigation explosion. For instance, Kristi Bowman outlines how
Latino/a students seeking better educational opportunities began seeing lower court victories
during the early 1970s. Kristi L. Bowman, Pursuing Educational Opportunities for Latinola
Students, 88 N.C. L. REV. 911, 925 (2010) (noting that in cases from 1969 and 1970, two
district "courts held that Latinos/as were an identifiable ethnic minority group protected by
Brown and were also separate from Whites and African Americans." (footnote omitted)).
49. See generally 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
50. Id.
51. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991).
52. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
53. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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suburban and rural schools are predominantly majority may be the function
of private residential choices, but it is difficult to discount the role official
de jure government segregation and its long-term effects have had on white
flight and the ensuing re-segregation of public schools. 4
B. The Advent of Colorblind Constitutionalism
In this section, we explore Brown's progeny outside the desegregation
context. In equal protection decisions covering affirmative action, poverty,
and immigrant status, we see the Court shift from a strong commitment to
integrative egalitarianism to colorblind constitutionalism, from a desire to
support racial integration and equality to a growing concern over reverse
discrimination and perceived governmental heavy-handedness.
1. The Rise and Decline of Affirmative Action
A second (near) casualty in the battle over desegregation and civil
rights post-Brown is affirmative action. Just as the Court lost its appetite for
monitoring school district desegregation efforts, it also became increasingly
disinterested in affirmative action programs designed to help level the edu-
cational and employment playing fields for minorities by setting aside ad-
missions seats or public monies for them, or by otherwise providing prefe-
rences to minority over majority competitors for jobs and education. From
the late 1970s to the present, we see a pattern of retrenchment and a shift in
focus away from affirmative action that paralleled the Court's withdrawal
from the school desegregation project begun after Brown I1.
The Court's first notable foray into affirmative action programs was a
sharp 5-to-4 split in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, where-
in the majority struck down a sixteen slot set-aside for minority students at
the University of California Davis medical school.5 Concerned that the set-
54. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & NANCY MCARDLE, THE VICIOUS CYCLE:
SEGREGATED HOUSING, SCHOOLS, AND INTERGENERATIONAL INEQUALITY 4 (2006) ("The
overall pattern of segregation by residence is serious, but the consequences are intensified
considerably for young people. White families with children live in more segregated com-
munities than whites in general, and the public schools-where the vast majority of non-
whites attend-are even more segregated than the residential patterns of the school age popu-
lation would suggest. Private and charter schools are more segregated still. School segrega-
tion is not just by race but almost always by poverty as well for black and Latino schools."),
available at www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/communitydevelopmentw06-4_orfield.pdf.
55. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For some of the many insightful writings on Bakke, see,
for example, Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745
(1996); Drew S. Days, Ill, Minority Access to Higher Education in the Post-Bakke Era, 55
U. COLO. L. REV. 491 (1984); Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional Criteria: The Social Science
and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065
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aside denied Allan Bakke, a white man, the opportunity to compete for all
100 slots in the medical school's entering class, five justices voted in his
favor although no majority opinion was produced outlining the appropriate
standard for reviewing such programs. Should strict scrutiny apply, render-
ing any race-based affirmative action plan presumptively suspect unless the
state can advance a compelling interest achieved by a sufficiently narrowly-
tailored policy? Or should some heightened, but less-than-strict, scrutiny
apply, deferentially upholding the plan as long it achieves some important
goal worth pursuing, such as remedying the long-term effects of Jim Crow
laws? Although he wrote only for himself, it was Justice Powell's en-
dorsement of the Harvard plan-in which an individual's race could be used
as one factor in furthering the university's compelling interest in promoting
diversity-that provided guidance to higher education administrators who
desired more inclusive admissions policies. 6
While public schools derived some utility from its opinions, Bakke
proved to raise more questions than it answered as to the proper standard of
review (strict or intermediate scrutiny) for what level of government inter-
vention (state, federal, or local), requiring the Court to issue further rulings
on the constitutional contours of affirmative action. As a ruling on a state
educational affirmative action plan, Bakke provided no clear guidance on
other governmental policies outside higher education, as evidenced in Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, where the Court upheld a federal program requiring that
minority-owned businesses receive a ten percent set-aside of federal public
works monies, expressly noting that Bakke did not establish any binding test
for evaluating affirmative action programs generally. 7 To add to the confu-
sion, the Court in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. invalidated a munic-
ipal plan to set aside thirty percent of local public works funds for minority-
owned businesses. 8 Although the Croson majority held that strict scrutiny
should be the proper standard for evaluating affirmative action plans, it was
unclear what effect that would have on older precedents such as Fullilove,
which produced no majority standard of review but upheld a federal set-
aside.
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
(Metro Broadcasting) tried to reconcile Fullilove and Croson by holding
that federally-enacted affirmative action plans would be subjected to inter-
mediate scrutiny only, and not the more stringent Croson standard, uphold-
(1997); Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action Retrospective, 87 GEO. L.J.
981 (1999).
56. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316.
57. 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (plurality opinion) (noting that the "opinion does not
adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as
[Bakke]").
58. See generally 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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ing a federal FCC broadcast licensing policy preferring minority-owned
businesses. 9 The Court reasoned that Congress's motivations were not in-
vidious, but benign, and should therefore be afforded deference: a majority
race choosing to burden itself denies no one equal protection. Following the
retirement of four of the justices in the Metro Broadcasting majority and
their replacement by more conservative jurists,' the Court took a decidedly
different approach in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, overruling Metro
Broadcasting and clearly establishing that strict scrutiny would be the lens
through which all affirmative action plans-federal, state, and local-would
be evaluated.6 After Adarand, all programs, irrespective of their benign
purpose to further the integration of racial minorities, would be subject to
strict scrutiny review, upheld only if the government is able to demonstrate
a compelling interest that it wished to advance and that the policy it had
chosen is narrowly tailored to further that objective.62
At first blush, one might be puzzled by what appears to be the Court's
inconsistency in withdrawing from its post-Brown desegregation project
while simultaneously strengthening its review of affirmative action plans.
However, this apparent inconsistency is illusory. Embracing an ideology
that all race-based government action is equally suspect and that therefore
the government should either refrain from playing morals police or treating
all individuals as individuals regardless of race, the Court embarked on pa-
rallel paths in its desegregation and affirmative action jurisprudence over
the past 40 years.63 Over time, race was viewed by a majority of the Court
as a thorny issue, and it became increasingly unwilling to defer to govern-
ments that sought to help disadvantaged minorities because of these pro-
grams' effects on disgruntled majority individuals, like Messrs. Bakke and
Adarand.
2. The Role of Poverty and Immigrant Status in Education
Aside from the emergence of strict scrutiny as the standard of review
of all race-based affirmative action programs, the Court also began to back
away from its lofty rhetoric in Brown extolling the importance of education
in U.S. society for all, regardless of status. In Brown, the Court highlighted
the significance of public education to our democracy:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
59. See generally 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
60. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, at 735.
61. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
62. Id.
63. See infra Subsection I1.B.3.
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democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public re-
sponsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may rea-
sonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.
64
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, Mexican-
American parents took these words to heart in arguing that Texas's unequal
property tax-based funding of its schools violated equal protection guaran-
tees.65 For instance, even tiough plaintiffs were assessed a higher school
property tax than those in a nearby wealthy district ($1.05 versus $0.85 per
$100 of assessed property), plaintiffs' school district had much less to spend
on each child than the wealthy district ($356 versus $594 per pupil).6
While affirming its importance, the Court found neither explicit nor implicit
protection for public education in the Constitution:
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection un-
der our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so
protected. As we have said, the undisputed importance of education will not alone
cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State's social
and economic legislation....
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [one's
First Amendment freedoms or right to vote], we have no indication that the present
levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short.
67
Put another way, unequal funding, even if arguably severe, does not violate
constitutional guarantees of equal treatment under the law. This was cer-
tainly a limitation on the seemingly expansive language of Brown. Rodri-
guez appeared to distinguish Brown to the extent Brown concerned itself
with the denial of education based on status; Rodriguez did not treat poverty
as debilitating as race, despite the large funding gap between the rich and
poor school districts in Texas.68
Fortunately, the Court had an opportunity to further refine this pover-
ty/status distinction in Plyler v. Doe, challenging the denial of a free public
education to undocumented students in Texas.69 In an effort to conserve
public funds, Texas required all children to prove they were in the country
64. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
65. See generally 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
66. Id. at 12-13.
67. Id. at 35-37.
68. Id. at 29-30.
69. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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legally before they could receive a free public education." Students who
could not prove their legal immigration status would be required to pay tui-
tion. In yet another 5-to-4 decision, the Court invalidated the Texas law.7'
While undocumented status was not irrelevant to fiscal decision-making,
Texas was not permitted to relegate undocumented children, whose immi-
gration status was not their own fault, to a permanent underclass of unedu-
cated youth.72 Citing Rodriguez, the Court reaffirmed that public education
is not a constitutional right, "[b]ut neither is it merely some governmental
'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.
Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and
the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinc-
tion."73
Instead of viewing Plyler and Rodriguez as points along a spectrum of
school funding, the Court decided that the Texas law in Plyler was a total
deprivation of a public education rather than a tax on poor families, as it
viewed Rodriguez. Put differently, the Plyler Court could have easily de-
cided that, because undocumented status is a rational means for differentiat-
ing between individuals and because conserving scarce public monies is a
legitimate governmental interest, requiring undocumented children to pay to
attend Texas public schools was reasonable and hence constitutional.74
Yet, the Plyler majority correctly assessed the Texas law for what its
probable effect would be:
[to impose] a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for
their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their
lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live
within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility
that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.
75
70. Id. at 206-07.
71. Id. at 230.
72. Id. at 220.
73. Id. at 221.
74. Despite the Supreme Court's holding many years ago, some are concerned that
Plyler's grant of free public education to undocumented children imposes an undue fiscal
burden upon states and localities. See, e.g., Michael McNutt, Bill Seeks Details on Non-U.S.
Students' in Oklahoma Schools, NEwsOK, (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.newsok.com/bill-
seeks-details-on-non-u.s.-students-in-oklahoma-schools/artice/3442072#ixzzgePB3fU
("A measure requiring school districts to report to the state the number of students who are
illegal immigrants and how much it's costing to educate them was passed by a House com-
mittee ...."); Nina Bernstein, Despite Ruling, Many School Districts Ask for Immigraion
Papers, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A16 ("Three decades after the Supreme Court ruled [in
Plyler] that immigration violations cannot be used as a basis to deny children equal access to
a public school education, one in five school districts in New York State is routinely requir-
ing a child's immigration papers as a prerequisite to enrollment, or asking parents for infor-
mation that only lawful immigrants can provide.").
75. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
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In Rodriguez, the poor Mexican-American children were at least able to
attend public school, impoverished as it was compared with the rich school
district; in contrast, in Plyler, the Texas law would have effectively denied
the undocumented children an opportunity to attend at all. Read together,
Rodriguez and Plyler stand for the proposition that a free public education is
important enough to guarantee that the state provide it to all individuals,
although it is not required to ensure that all students within the state receive
roughly equivalent school funding.
And so, in Rodriguez and Plyler, we see the Court establishing what
seems to be a constitutionally-required minimum floor of educational rights,
post-Brown. Just as it withdrew from a robust commitment to both dese-
gregation and affirmative action the more time had elapsed since Brown, the
Court in Rodriguez and Plyler also retreated from what seemed to be a clear
mandate to ensure the full integration of schools regardless of status-
whether racial, economic, or immigrant-given the singular importance of
public education. Instead of a constitutionally thick conception of the pub-
lic education rights of all children, we have instead a rather stunted view,
one that leaves the poorest and most vulnerable without assurances of a
more level playing field (Rodriguez) beyond the minimum guarantee that
they at least get to play on a public education field with the rest of the child-
ren (Brown and Plyler76).
3. Desegregation/Affirmative Action Redux: Grutter, Gratz and Parents
Involved
Having clarified the boundaries of a state's obligations to provide edu-
cational access under Brown through Rodriguez and Plyler, the Court in the
last decade issued three opinions further exploring whether certain tradi-
tionally disadvantaged groups could be provided governmental assistance to
ensure their integration into society writ large, culminating in Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (Parents In-
volved)," one that arguably muddies the doctrinal distinctions typically
drawn between the Court's desegregation precedents and its affirmative
action jurisprudence.
The first two opinions return to the issue of affirmative action in high-
er education. In Grutter v. Bollinger78 and Gratz v. Bollinger,79 the Court
76. Note, too, that the Court has expressed, in dicta, that Plyler's result was unique,
suggesting its reluctance to expand Plyler's version of educational rights as a constitutional
matter (although this says nothing about the constitutionality of a state law like AB540 that
extends Plyler's reach to protect undocumented college-bound students). See Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459, 462 (1988) (rejecting claim of right to free school
transportation).
77. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
78. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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was confronted with two affirmative action plans challenged by white ap-
plicants to the University of Michigan's Law School and College of Litera-
ture, Science, and the Arts, respectively. The Court issued a split decision,
upholding the law school plan, but striking the college plan as unconstitu-
tional. Applying Adarand's strict scrutiny test and echoing Justice Powell's
approach in Bakke, the Court ruled that enrolling a meaningfully diverse
student body was a compelling interest a state university could choose to
pursue, concluding that "[e]ffective participation by members of all racial
and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of
one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized."8 ° However, the Court split 5-to-4
over the means by which the two Michigan schools aimed to achieve diver-
sity. The law school's program hewed closely to Justice Powell's view in
which race was just one factor among many diversity factors, not one sub-
ject to specific quotas but rather focused on the applicant as a whole person,
all the while keeping an eye to admitting a critical mass of underrepresented
minorities.8
In contrast, the undergraduate college's program of assigning a specif-
ic number of quality points to applicants based on certain attributes-among
which was minority status-operated more like a quota system by prevent-
ing non-minority candidates from obtaining any points solely because of
their racial background.82 Just as colleges and universities closely studied
Powell's Bakke opinion, higher education administrators have, in turn,
parsed Grutter and Gratz, seeking ways to promote meaningful diversity
notwithstanding Justice O'Connor's prediction of a twenty-five year sunset
on affirmative action plans83 and various referenda ending affirmative action
in states like California84 and Washington.85 Although affirmative action is
not constitutionally dead, it is clear that, beginning with Bakke and then
progressing through Croson to Adarand to Gratz, Grutter proves a narrow
exception to the general rule barring governmental initiatives to improve the
employment and educational prospects of minorities, unless such laws bene-
fit all students by creating a diverse learning environment. Rodriguez and
Plyler further teach us that such learning environments need not be uniform-
ly funded as long as they are open to all, regardless of socioeconomic or
79. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
80. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
81. Id. at334-41.
82. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-74.
83. "We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer
be necessary to further the interest approved today." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
84. California Civil Rights Initiative, Proposition 209 (1996), available at
http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/Vote96/html/BP/209text.htm.
85. Washington State Civil Rights Initiative 200 (1998), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i200.pdf.
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immigration status.s6 Once again, Professor Bell's "interest convergence"
idea is instructive: a majority of the Court appears willing to endorse go-
vernmental interventions that benefit the underprivileged only where these
do not offend majoritarian sensibilities because they offer broader lessons
for all (diversity is good, Grutter) or they do not unduly interfere with exist-
ing privilege (rich schools remain rich, Rodriguez).7
The final case in the trilogy from the past decade is Parents Involved,"
which held unconstitutional two public school student assignment plans that
relied on comparing the race of the transferred students to the existing racial
composition of the schools in order to ensure that residentially-isolated mi-
nority students were not foreclosed from enrolling in the most desirable
schools. Because the school districts were not attempting to remedy dejure
segregation but were instead aiming to stem defacto re-segregation, the 5-
to-4 majority was unwilling to defer to the districts' assessment of what
constituted an equitable racial balance even if their goals could be characte-
rized as inclusive and not invidious.
Invoking Brown, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that "[t]he way to
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis
of race."89 Concurring, Justice Thomas likened the school districts to the
segregationists in Brown, stating in contrast that his "view [of a colorblind
constitution] was the rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated Brown."9 In
dissent, Justice Stevens questioned the majority's faithfulness to Brown's
principles:
THE CHIEF JUSTICE fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were
[discriminated against]; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white child-
86. For more on school finance litigation, see, for example, Bowman, supra note 48;
Preston C. Green, III, Bruce D. Baker, & Joseph 0. Oluwole, Achieving Racial Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity Through School Finance Litigation, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 283 (2008);
Preston C. Green, III, Bruce D. Baker & Joseph 0. Oluwole, Race-Conscious Funding Strat-
egies and School Finance Litigation, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39 (2006); Molly McUsic, The
Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307
(1991).
87. In the same "interest convergence" vein, Plyler might appropriately be read as
acceptable because, even though it prevents states from charging undocumented students
tuition, rich students (and more to the point, their rich parents) won't be directly affected by
this because they will be able to attend the rich school districts unaffected by Rodriguez.
88. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). For more on Parents Involved, see, for example, Preston
C. Green, III, Julie F. Mead, & Joseph Oluwole, Parents Involved, School Assignment Plans,
and the Equal Protection Clause: The Case for Special Constitutional Rules, __ BROOK. L.
REv. _ (forthcoming 2011) (draft on file with author) (arguing that the Court's adoption of
the colorblind principle is not supported by the history and text of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and is inconsistent with the Court's jurisprudence regarding constitutional conflicts
between school districts and students).
89. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748.
90. Id. at 772 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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ren struggling to attend black schools. In this and other ways, THE CHIEF JUSTICE
rewrites the history of one of this Court's most important decisions.
9 1
Parents Involved teaches us at least three important lessons about the
legacy of Brown in light of the Court's desegregation and affirmative action
jurisprudence. First, doctrinally, Parents Involved seems to blur the line
between the school desegregation and affirmative action cases. The student
assignment plans at issue were not designed to remedy segregation and,
therefore, bore a closer resemblance to the recent educational affirmative
action cases, Grutter and Gratz. While the Parents Involved majority li-
mited Grutter's diversity principle to the higher education context,92 the
rhetoric of the opinion closely resembles then Chief Justice Rehnquist's
view in Gratz.93 Both Roberts and Rehnquist appear to assert that even as-
suming its benign motives for providing educational access to students of
color, the state may not use race to discriminate against majority students
absent specific proof of unconstitutional discrimination requiring remedia-
tion. Any re-segregation of the classroom is presumptively due to private
choices (based on residential patterns, Parents Involved) or the application
of neutral admissions standards (Gratz), not governmental interference.
Second, and related to the first point, the Court's reluctance to permit
aggressive legislative integration policies in pursuit of desegregation and
affirmative action suggests how far the colorblind conception of equal rights
has permeated its jurisprudence. Recall the difference in how Brown was
cited by the various Parents Involved justices in the majority and minority.
For Roberts and Thomas, Brown is about never treating others differently
based on skin color and embracing the colorblind ideal; for Stevens, Brown
is about alleviating the subordination of a minority group at the hands of a
majority group. The school districts in Parents Involved were discriminat-
ing on the basis of race, and that fact alone was enough to render their ac-
tions unconstitutional in Roberts's and Thomas's eyes. Stevens and the
other dissenters appreciated the context of the school districts' decisions:
they saw the government wanting to make sure that black children were not
barred access to the more desirable schools, not unlike how they were his-
torically barred in Brown. Viewed in this light, Grutter and Plyler, not
Gratz and Rodriguez, are the proper heirs to Brown, for the former uphold
the promise of integrating students from less-privileged backgrounds into
society's mainstream; in contrast, the latter maintain the status quo (as does
Parents Involved, for that matter) notwithstanding that doing so relegates
minority students-whether by racial, socioeconomic, or immigrant sta-
tus-to the back of the proverbial bus.
91. Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
92. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724-25.
93. Compare Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-72 (2003), with Parents In-
volved, 551 U.S. at 723.
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Third, Parents Involved also supports the "interest convergence" the-
sis through its revisionist reading of Brown. Whereas, in its most iconic
sense, Brown might have stood for the idea that absolute equality in public
education is a constitutional imperative, in its current incarnation in light of
Parents Involved (and Gratz, Bakke, and Rodriguez), Brown embraces the
notion of a colorblind Constitution that protects all individuals regardless of
race, no matter that one's lived experience in the U.S. (and in its public
schools) cannot help but be shaped by one's racial, socioeconomic, and im-
migrant status.
In sum, the Court's failure to promote desegregation and affirmative
action bespeaks its reluctance to fully embrace a robust version of Brown's
"integrative egalitarianism" principle: aggressive government action to help
those at society's margins effectively integrate into and become part of the
mainstream community. The current miserly reading of our Constitution's
equality principles challenges all federal, state, and local government enti-
ties to find ways to promote education among the least fortunate, while rais-
ing awareness of the lost promise and potential of Brown as a precedential
vehicle for transformative, integrative change.
C. Situating Martinez in the post-Brown Context
Reflecting on Brown's legacy sheds new light on the Martinez litiga-
tion. In AB540, the California legislature is attempting to further Brown's
commitment to equality and integration by permitting talented, dedicated
California graduates the opportunity to attend its colleges and universities at
reduced cost, regardless of their immigration status.94 AB540 extends by
policy what Plyler guaranteed to undocumented students constitutionally:
an opportunity for students like "Nicole" to further their education and ful-
fill their promise as productive members of society." And analogous to
Michigan's calculus in Grutter, California believes that investing in its high
school graduates will benefit not only undocumented students, but their
classmates, the university, and the state as well.
Of course, the out-of-state plaintiffs in Martinez do not see things this
way. Instead, they believe that their status as U.S. citizens provides them
protection under federal law that should trump California's desire to help
further the education of its undocumented high school graduates.96 In their
view, federal laws limiting benefits to the undocumented dictate that Cali-
fornia has but two choices, either to extend tuition subsidies to all persons,
regardless of where they currently reside or where they attended high
94. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2011) (AB540 refers to Assembly Bill 540,
which was codified as § 68130.5).
95. § 68130.5.
96. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 869 (Cal. 2010).
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school, or to repeal AB540; otherwise, the Martinez plaintiffs believe the
courts should rule that AB540 is preempted by federal law.97
In a sense, the Martinez plaintiffs invoke an exception to the "color-
blind constitution" rule. The Constitution recognizes and preserves differ-
ences between U.S. citizens and noncitizens, and our federal laws limit how
states might treat undocumented persons in their midst. Yet, the Martinez
plaintiffs' privileging of their citizenship status works a similar injustice as
the privileging of the white race did prior to Brown. Put differently, just as
one's majority race operates as a privilege, so does one's citizenship status.
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Martinez," it may
well be faced in the future with trying to clarify the boundaries between
state and federal power over immigrant education: should the Court abide
U.S. citizenship as a federalism trump, denying states an opportunity to
level the educational playing field? Or should the Court embrace the inte-
grationist, egalitarian ideals of Brown and recognize that state laws like
AB540 are not designed to discriminate against U.S. citizens, but are in-
stead intended to invest in talented undocumented students?
The problem with framing the issue thusly is that most U.S. citizens
readily accept the U.S. citizen-noncitizen divide as a rational one, and in-
deed, the Supreme Court has affirmed the federal government's supremacy
in legislating the borders of that bright line.99 Indeed, in many ways, the
long history of Brown's desegregation and affirmative action jurisprudence
suggests that the integrative egalitarianism ideal is not one the Court readily
embraces where race is at issue. Put differently, Brown's legacy has been
more about maintaining white privilege than dismantling it, and the few
gains by minorities can be readily explained by Bell's interest convergence
principle.
Yet, if we think outside the box for a momentthere might be a differ-
ent explanation for minorities' gains apart from interest convergence that
becomes apparent by examining the Court's recent gay rights jurisprudence.
Applying a standard no stricter than rational basis, the Court in Romer and
Lawrence affirmed the idea that unpopular or disfavored minority group
members may not be discriminated against just because they are in a mi-
nority group.' As applied to the Martinez litigation, we can see that
AB540 does not discriminate against a minority group; at best, it might dis-
97. Id. at 860, 861-62.
98. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 869 (Cal. 2010), cert.
denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. June 6, 2011) (No. 10-1029).
99. Within immigration law, this has come to be known as the "plenary power"
doctrine. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration,
Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995).
100. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 574-76 (2003).
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criminate against a privileged immigration-status group-a sub-class of
U.S. citizens-and it does not do so because of any animus, but because it
aims to uphold the egalitarian, integrative vision of Brown by helping un-
derprivileged but talented undocumented students attend college.
Indeed, if laws like AB540 are eventually held preempted by federal
law, one might question what interest Congress would have in denying Cali-
fornia the right to enact educational policy as it sees fit. Might siding with
the plaintiffs be more akin to the animus found in Romer and Lawrence?
Citizens have many options for private and public higher education within
their own state and others (and, indeed, some former California high school
graduates will be unintended beneficiaries of the law). What interest would
the federal government have in denying California the opportunity to level
the playing field for the undocumented? Why must U.S. citizens who never
attended a California high school be entitled to a subsidized college educa-
tion over an undocumented person who has, simply because the former is a
U.S. citizen? Does U.S. citizenship entitle one to a subsidized California
education?
Shifting focus from Brown's progeny and race to the struggle -for gay
rights provides yet another way of looking at the issue. Whereas the post-
Brown struggle for racial equality and educational equity shifted from con-
cerns over effectively integrating underrepresented minorities in the dese-
gregation and affirmative action contexts to colorblind evenhandedness and
the impact such efforts had on the majority, recent Supreme Court jurispru-
dence regarding gay rights has focused more on the limits of a majority's
power to marginalize an identifiable minority group. It is this frame-the
constitutional limits on majoritarian power-that may prove to be the more
salient one when examining what egalitarian integration might mean in the
context of the Martinez plaintiffs' assertion that their federal citizenship
rights trump California's modest attempt to foster a more inclusive society.
III. FROM BOWERS TO ROMER TO LA WRENCE: LESSONS FROM ANOTHER
STRUGGLE
While the Court has retreated from a more robust commitment to anti-
subordination in its desegregation and affirmative action jurisprudence, it
has simultaneously found for gay rights plaintiffs in two prominent cases
decided in the late 1990s and early 2000s. That these decisions were au-
thored by a politically conservative Court that had limited civil rights in
several race cases over the same period is particularly interesting. These
two cases-Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas-provide important
clues as to when the Court might be inclined to find that democratically-
enacted laws more likely reflect animus or invidious discrimination rather
than the shared values of a community striving to accurately define itself in
pursuit of the common good.
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But before Romer and Lawrence, there was Bowers v. Hardwick,"' in-
famous for its pernicious view of sexual minorities. In Bowers, the Court
upheld a Georgia law that criminalized sodomy. Although the law did not
differentiate between heterosexual and gay sodomy, the case involved the
prosecution of a gay man, Michael Hardwick. Writing for a 5-to-4 majority,
Justice White opined that gay persons did not have a constitutional right to
engage in private, consensual sex under the Due Process Clause."2 White
cited the long history of anti-sodomy laws and Georgia's belief in the im-
morality of homosexual conduct as reasons for the Court deferring to the
state." 3 Interestingly, Justice Powell, who had supplied the swing vote for
the majority, publicly acknowledged in later years that he had erred in sid-
ing against Michael Hardwick."°
Ten years after Bowers, the Court had a second opportunity to consid-
er a sexual orientation discrimination case in Romer. 5 In an effort to stem
the tide of municipal laws protecting sexual minorities from employment
and housing discrimination, the people of Colorado passed Amendment 2 to
the state constitution, outlawing all such laws. Framed as a "no special
rights" initiative, Amendment 2's proponents waged an aggressive cam-
paign, warning against the evils of homosexuality and arguing that sexual
minorities should not be entitled to special rights simply because of their
practices. 6 In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court deemed Amendment 2 an un-
constitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Although it did not
find sexual minorities a suspect class and therefore purported to apply but a
rational basis review, the Court found the sheer breadth and scope of the
law untenable:
101. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
102. Id. at 191.
103. Id. at 192-94 & nn.5-6.
104. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 530 (1994) (discussing a
1990 NYU lecture where Powell conceded his vote in Bowers v. Hardwick was a mistake).
105. Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
106. A recent case from last term provides additional insight into this "special rights
versus equal rights" debate. Although styled as a First Amendment, not gay rights, case, in
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law
v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010), the Court found that the Christian Legal Society (CLS)
had no right to be formally recognized by the Hastings Law School, which revoked the
group's student organization status following CLS's admission that it precluded gays from
membership. CLS had argued that it was the Law School that had unlawfully discriminated
against CLS by singling it out for punishment. Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion con-
cluded otherwise: "CLS, it bears emphasis, seeks not parity with other organizations, but a
preferential exemption from Hastings' policy. The First Amendment shields CLS against
state prohibition of the organization's expressive activity, however exclusionary that activity
may be. But CLS enjoys no constitutional right to state subvention of its selectivity." Id. at
2978. Unlike gay rights advocates in Romer, it was CLS that sought preferential treatment;
gay rights advocates simply wanted to enjoy rights and privileges everyone else enjoyed,
including fair access to housing and employment.
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[T]he amendment imposes a special disability upon these persons alone. Homo-
sexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without con-
straint.... These are protections taken for granted by most people either because
they already have them or do not need them;'0 7 these are protections against exclu-
sion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute
ordinary civic life in a free society.' 0
From the Court's perspective, to take the unprecedented route of
amending a state constitution to specifically deny equal rights to a class of
people simply because one has the votes to do so suggested an irrational
prejudice. Quoting Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno, the Court opined:
".[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare.., desire to harm a po-
litically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental inter-
est. "'109
Predictably, Justice Scalia's stinging dissent raised the specter of
Bowers, which was then still good law."' In his view, even if Colorado's
amended constitution made it more difficult for sexual minorities to seek
legal protection, such a result was no worse than the criminalization of sod-
omy upheld in Bowers: "If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to
make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible
for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct.""'
That Romer was an equal protection case striking down a law that reached
sexual orientation, not just conduct, whereas Bowers more narrowly focused
on sanctionable conduct under substantive due process, seemed legal dis-
tinctions that required reconciliation and clarification.
The Court finally resolved this inherent tension between Bowers and
Romer by deciding Lawrence in 2003." 2 At issue in Lawrence was Texas's
anti-sodomy statute, criminalizing same-sex activity as "deviant."" 3  In
another 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled Bowers, noting that the Due
Process Clause protects the right of all adults to engage in private, consen-
sual sexual activity, irrespective of their sexual orientation."4 While ac-
knowledging the long history of anti-sodomy laws, the majority noted that
107. See, e.g., Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack,
PEACE & FREEDOM, July/Aug. 1989, at 10, 10 ("As a white person, I realized I had been
taught about racism as something which puts others at a disadvantage, but had been taught
not to see one of its corollary aspects, white privilege, which puts me at an advantage.").
108. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
109. Id. at 634-35 (quoting Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)) (alteration in original).
110. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 641.
112. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
113. Id. at 563.
114. Id. at 564-79.
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anti-same-sex sodomy statutes are of more recent vintage." 5 That fact,
combined with its decisions in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey"6 (reaffirming the substantive content of due process) and
Romer"7 (invalidating as irrational an anti-homosexual law), led the Court
to conclude that Texas had no legitimate interest in criminalizing private
sexual conduct between consenting adults."8 Moral disapproval of same-
sex conduct could not, by itself, be sufficient to justify its criminalization." 9
As applied to the Martinez plaintiffs' assault on California's AB540,
Romer and Lawrence reflect a Court reluctant to allow a majority to impose
its morals and values upon a minority group simply because it can. From an
anti-subordination perspective, the Court reads the due process and equal
protection components of the Fourteenth Amendment in the spirit they were
originally intended-to ensure that no one is denied the opportunity to pur-
sue her American dream simply because of an accident of her birth. State
DREAM Acts like California's AB540 further, rather than hinder, their be-
neficiaries' American dreams by providing a pathway to full citizenship and
membership for those unfairly burdened by circumstances beyond their con-
trol.
Unlike the unconstitutional laws struck down in Romer and Lawrence,
state DREAM Acts have a legitimate purpose: to help talented students
achieve their fullest potential through higher education, unfettered by their
immigration status. 2 ' Viewed in this light, it is the Martinez plaintiffs' po-
sition that appears unreasonable. By reading the federal statutes so strictly
that they prevent the states from pursuing legitimate ends and by assuming
that U.S. citizenship automatically entitles the plaintiffs to state benefits
seems a stretch. After all, nothing in AB540 prevents the Martinez plain-
115. Id. at 569.
116. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
117. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
118. Johnson, 539 U.S. at 560.
119. Interestingly, while the DREAM Act floundered, Congress approved a repeal of
the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on December 18, 2010. See, e.g., Carl Hulse,
Senate Ends Military Ban on Gays Serving Openly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at Al.
120. To the extent that immigration status is properly a federal, and not a state, con-
cern, California is exactly right to regard it as irrelevant to its determination of which stu-
dents it should support. Put differently, California is interested in supporting a core group of
dedicated California high school graduates regardless of their immigration status. Just as
Arizona's anti-immigration bill SB1070 was popularly viewed as a way to prompt federal
action on comprehensive immigration reform, California's AB540 (and the other state
DREAM Act laws) should also be considered a nudge in the direction of passing the federal
DREAM Act. A recent report by the Migration Policy Institute suggests that California
should be particularly interested in the federal DREAM Act's passage as approximately
500,000 Californians would likely.benefit. See JEANNE BATALOVA & MARGIE McHUGH,
MIGRATION POLICY INST., DREAM vs. REALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL DREAM ACT
BENEFICIARIES 10 (2010), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/DREAM-
Insight-July2010.pdf.
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tiffs from also receiving tuition subsidies if they attend and graduate from a
California high school. By its terms, the law discriminates, if at all, on the
basis of high school attendance and graduation, not on citizenship or resi-
dence.
One objection to this line of reasoning might be that the law operates
as a de facto residency requirement, and therefore runs afoul of the federal
law. Presumably, the federal government has a legitimate interest in pre-
venting states from favoring undocumented persons, who are barred from
residence anywhere in the United States, over U.S. citizens. Thus, the high
school attendance and graduation requirement favors California residents,
including undocumented persons, over out-of-state U.S. citizens.
As defenders of the California law are quick to point out, first, undo-
cumented persons themselves are required to comply with the attendance
and graduation requirements, regardless of their residence, and second,
there are any number of non-resident U.S. citizens who would be eligible
for this benefit such as:
U.S. citizens who attended high school in California but have resided in another
state after completing high school and before enrolling in college or graduate
school; students who attend boarding school for part of the year in California while
maintaining a permanent residence in another state; students living in an adjoining
state which is contiguous to a California school district who attend the California
school; and students whose actual and legal residence is in a foreign country adja-
cent to this state, and who regularly return within a twenty-four-hour period to said
foreign country.'21
The California Supreme Court embraced this analysis. 22
If, as the Court noted in Romer, the Equal Protection Clause stands for
nothing if not that majorities may not impose their will upon a disfavored
group simply because they can, and if Lawrence warns us against the dan-
gers of adopting majoritarian notions of morality for their own sake, we
must take seriously the consequences of siding with the Martinez plaintiffs.
While a critic might contend that a vote for the plaintiffs is a vote for the
rule of law and the primacy of citizenship as an important legal and social
status, what might the cost be? Even if we're not persuaded by the analo-
gies to the Court's recent gay rights jurisprudence, the parallels are worth
thinking about. What is gained by depriving hardworking students like
"Nicole" the opportunity to further their education? If one function of edu-
cation is to improve society through an investment in the best and the brigh-
121. See Martinez Brief, supra note 21, at 12-13.
122. See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 860 (Cal. 2010)
("Because the exemption is given to all who have attended high school in California for at
least three years (and meet the other requirements), and not all who have done so qualify as
California residents for purposes of in-state tuition, and further because not all unlawful
aliens who would qualify as residents but for their unlawful status are eligible for the exemp-
tion, we conclude the exemption is not based on residence in California.").
Vol. 2011:275
HeinOnline  -- 2011 Mich. St. L. Rev. 300 2011
Immigrant Education
test, what is gained by effectively denying access to one segment of society
based on an accident of birth?
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of these DREAM acts is an
economic one. It makes little sense to invest in the primary and secondary
education of all students pursuant to Plyler only to abandon college-bound
undocumented students based purely on their status. Finding ways to help
the most talented students succeed, regardless of their race, poverty, or im-
migrant status, inevitably pays dividends to the society writ large. Taken
together, state and federal DREAM acts seek to eliminate the major fiscal
and immigration barriers to students who, by an accident of birth, do not
have the same educational opportunities as middle-class U.S. citizens.
While clearly not a guarantee of success,'23 these acts invest in some of the
best and the brightest, helping them to eventually become, like Nicole, full
contributing members of our nation and their communities.'24
123. Even if students are successful in making it to college, those from disadvantaged
backgrounds are more likely to have difficulty graduating. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Once in
First Place, Americans Now Lag in Attaining College Degrees, N.Y. TIMEs, July 23, 2010, at
A ll ("We spend a fortune recruiting freshmen but forget to recruit sophomores .... " (quot-
ing Michael McPherson, President, Spencer Foundation)); see also Michael A. Olivas, The
Political Economy of the DREAMAct and the Legislative Process: A Case Study of Compre-
hensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L. REv. 1757, 1764 & n.28 (2009) (noting the par-
ticular challenges faced by the relatively small number of undocumented students who cur-
rently attend college, an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 out of eighteen million nationwide, or
substantially less than one percent of total enrollment). A preliminary study of the impact
the Texas and California DREAM Acts have had on increasing undocumented access sug-
gests a slight positive effect, especially among older Mexican men, although overall benefit
appears negligible; the authors caution, however, that the data they examined may have been
too soon after the laws' passage in 2001 to usefully predict any long-term effects of the law.
See Aimee Chin & Chinhui Juhn, Does Reducing College Costs Improve Educational Out-
comes for Undocumented Immigrants? Evidence from State Laws Permitting Undocumented
Immigrants to Pay In-State Tuition at State Colleges and Universities (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 15932, 2010), available at http:/www.nber.org/papers/
w15932.
124. Viewed in this way, undocumented college-bound students are an untapped
resource that would be a tremendous benefit to the U.S. through the federal DREAM Act.
See Romero, supra note 19, at 416 ("But an arguably untapped source of potential future
labor would be those undocumented postsecondary school students who are precluded from
pursuing a college education because of their immigration status or limited finances. If Con-
gress would formally acknowledge that education is work, and that superior high school
performance leading to college admission is a sign of employment potential, it would avail
the country of a future labor source already educated within and familiar with the U.S. school
system. Just as an employment-based immigrant visa may be viewed as a fair exchange for
the anticipated contributions of the immigrating employee, the [federal bill's] adjustment of
status provision implicitly acknowledges the work undocumented high school students have
done to gain acceptance into a U.S. college or university.").
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IV. PLYLER REDUX: RECLAIMING THE ANTISUBORDINATION PROMISE OF
OUR AMENDED CONSTITUTION
At the end of the day, we are left to ruminate on the true meanings of
Brown and Plyler. Viewing these landmark civil rights education cases
through the lens of Romer and Lawrence adds depth to our analysis, for we
realize how irrelevant and irrational alienage discrimination is in the educa-
tion context. If Brown stands for integrative egalitarianism, and Plyler for
the irrationality of denying a basic education to a blameless class based on
their immigration status, and if Romer and Lawrence teach us that the Four-
teenth Amendment requires a vigilant awareness of how majorities can pre-
judicially disenfranchise minorities, then it seems patently clear that the
California Supreme Court was right in finding against the Martinez plain-
tiffs. California correctly understands that one's immigration status is irre-
levant to one's ability to succeed as a student and to become a contributing
member of society. Those who invoke federal law as an absolute bar to
state anti-subordination pursuits, privileging U.S. citizenship and disparag-
ing undocumented status, should bear the burden of proof as to how immi-
gration status-like race or sexual orientation-might be a relevant basis for
denying someone her chance to fulfill her own American dream.
CONCLUSION
To close, let us consider the results of a recent medical study that
gives the lie to assuming a blanket preference for U.S. citizens over nonciti-
zens. Dr. John Norcini and his colleagues discovered that foreign-born
medical doctors who graduated from foreign medical schools perform just
as well as those born and trained in the United States.'25 Interestingly, they
also found that U.S. citizens who graduated from foreign medical schools
did not perform as well as their peers; the researchers surmised that foreign-
trained U.S. citizens' poorer performance may be because they could not get
in to selective medical schools stateside.126 Put differently, this extensive
study of over 240,000 hospitalizations in Pennsylvania from 2003 to 2006
suggests that U.S. foreign-trained students performed less well than immi-
grant foreign-trained students; indeed, the noncitizen students did better on
average than the U.S. citizens. 27 In a similar vein, California's decision to
provide access to undocumented students makes sense-not because they
might be better than U.S. citizens, but because we should encourage success
125. John J. Norcini et al., Evaluating the Quality of Care Provided By Graduates of
International Medical Schools, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1461, 1466-67 (2010).
126. See Denise Grady, Foreign-Born Doctors Give Equal Care in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 2010, at D7; Norcini et al., supra note 125, at 1466-67.
127. See Norcini et al., supra note 125, at 1464.
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in the best and brightest, regardless of citizenship. Providing access to col-
lege for excellent undocumented students does just that.
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